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I. INTRODUCTION
As commerce in the United States continues to evolve, businesses
find themselves entangled in increasingly complex commercial litiga-
tion. Although the Seventh Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil suits,1 some courts
deny jury trial demands in complex commercial litigation. The ra-
tionale offered by these courts is that when the issues involved are
beyond the competence of jurors, a jury trial would violate the liti-
gants' due process rights, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.2
This Article first examines the current disagreement in United
States federal courts with regard to jury trials in complex commercial
litigation. Second, it discusses the origins of the jury trial in the
United States legal system. Third, this Article traces the evolution of
specialized commercial courts in foreign legal systems. Fourth, it
considers the implications of the increasing internationalization of
* Professor of Business Law, College of Commerce and Business Administration, Uni-
versity of Illinois; B.A., City University of New York, 1968; J.D., University of Illinois, 1971;
Diploma in International Law, Stockholm University, 1973.
** Research Librarian, University of Oklahoma Law Library; B.A., University of North
Alabama, 1965; J.D., Washburn University, 1990; M.L.I.S., University of Illinois, 1991.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law.
Id.
2. Id. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp.
889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069 (3d Cir. 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49
(N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nonm Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d
1188 (9th Cir. 1980); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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trade. Finally, this Article discusses Pennsylvania's proposal to estab-
lish a specialized commercial court in Pennsylvania whose jurisdic-
tion would extend only to corporate and commercial matters, and
would not provide a right to trial by jury.
This Article suggests that specialized commercial courts without
juries would expedite the commercial litigation process, and would
enable litigants to conduct complex litigation before judges with com-
mercial expertise. In addition, establishing specialized commercial
courts would eliminate the potentially capricious results associated
with juries, which are frequently unable to comprehend the relation-
ship between the law and complex commercial issues. Therefore, liti-
gating complex commercial cases in specialized courts would lead to
more equitable resolutions.
II. UNITED STATES COURTS ARE SPLIT ON THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL IN COMPLEX COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
The Pennsylvania judicial system experienced a preview of the
complex commercial issues that courts can expect to face with in-
creasing frequency, when the landmark case of Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 3 was filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Although the
district court surveyed the case's infinite complexity and the litigants
estimated that the trial would last a full year, the court granted a
demand for a jury trial.4 On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the
district court ruling on the ground that the case was too complex for a
trial by jury. 5 Nine years of discovery had produced "millions of doc-
uments and over 100,000 pages of depositions."' 6 Further, the com-
plaint alleged a conspiracy among twenty-four defendants, one
hundred co-conspirators, and the Japanese government to maintain
artificially low prices for Japanese electronic products over a period of
approximately fifteen years.7 The plaintiffs sought recovery under the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act.8 In
addition, some of the defendants counter-claimed against the plaintiffs
3. 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
4. Id. at 895.
5. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1069.
6. Id. at 1073.
7. Zenith Radio Corp., 478 F. Supp. at 894.
8. Id. at 893-94; Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2 (1988)); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988));
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988)).
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and thirty alleged co-conspirators for violations of the Lanham Act,
the Sherman Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act.9
United States federal courts are split on the issue of whether the
right to a jury trial should be upheld regardless of the complexity of
civil litigation. Several federal courts have either remanded for fur-
ther clarification on the issue of complexity or denied jury demands in
complex civil cases.10 Other courts, faced with cases having as much
or more complexity than Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co.,II have upheld the right to a jury trial. 12 For example,
in In re US. Financial Securities Litigation, the Southern District
Court of California held that the issues of the case were too complex
for a jury trial.' 3 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision, despite records even more voluminous than those in
Zenith Radio Corp. 1
4
There is currently no bright-line test by which to measure
9. Zenith Radio Corp., 478 F. Supp. at 895; Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976) (cur-
rent version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988)); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988)); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988)).
10. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980); Bern-
stein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75
F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Rutledge v. Elec. Hose and Rubber Co., 511 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 1975).
11. 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Anti-
trust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
12. See, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merch. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Tenn.
1980), aff'd, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.
1979).
13. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. at 705-06. In re U.S. Financial Securities
Litigation involved five plaintiffs, in eighteen consolidated lawsuits, against over one hundred
defendants. Id. Three years of discovery had produced over 150,000 pages of depositions and
over 5,000,000 documents. Id. at 706-07. The trial judge anticipated that the trial would
extend over two years, and was unsure whether there was a courtroom large enough to accom-
modate all of the attorneys, let alone the jurors and alternates. Id. at 715.
14. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979). According to the Ninth
Circuit,
To consider the practical abilities and limitations of juries within the context of com-
plex cases would necessitate an examination of the whole case. However, the Sev-
enth Amendment right has never been made dependent upon such an examination; it
has always been the nature of the issue .... The assumption that attorneys cannot
develop and present complex cases to a jury underestimates the abilities of the
bar .... Whether a case is tried to a jury or to a judge, the task of the attorney
remains the same. The attorney must organize and assemble a complex mass of in-
formation into a form which is understandable to the uninitiated.
Id. at 426-27.
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whether a case is too complex for a jury to arrive at a rational decision
based on the evidence adduced at trial.15 However, the Third Circuit,
in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, articulated
three factors a court should consider when determining the complex-
ity of a case. 16 First, a court should consider the overall size of the
suit, as indicated by the anticipated length of trial, the amount of evi-
dence involved, and the number of issues that will require individual
consideration.17 Second, the court should consider the conceptual dif-
ficulties of the legal issues and their factual underpinnings. I s This fac-
tor can be demonstrated by the amount of expert testimony to be
submitted, as well as by the probable length and detail of jury instruc-
tions.19 Finally, the court should consider the difficulty a jury will
encounter in segregating distinct aspects of the case, as indicated by
the number of separately disputed issues related to a single transac-
tion or item of proof.20
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Courts are often reluctant to find a level of complexity that
would remove a case from a jury trial, due to the significance of the
Seventh Amendment's express guarantee of the right to a jury trial in
civil cases-a hallmark of the United States system of justice since the
birth of our nation.2' To understand this right, one must examine its
historical roots, as derived from early common law and incorporated
into the Bill of Rights.
When adopted in 1789, the United States Constitution contained
15. See Davis-Watkins Co., 500 F. Supp. at 1244. "Unfortunately, no litmus-paper test
exists to determine complexity. The issue is whether the case is so complex that a jury cannot
make a rational decision based on the evidence adduced at trial." Id.
16. See In re Japanese Elec Avd Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1088-89. This test is some-
what similar to the three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970). The Court stated that courts could consider three factors in determining
whether the legal nature of an issue in a statutorily based cause of action should be resolved by
a jury trial: "[F]irst, the pre-merger [of law and equity] custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries."
Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10 (emphasis added).
17. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1088-89.
18. Id. at 1089.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merch. Co., 500 F.
Supp. 1244 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub nom. In re Japa-
nese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
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no provision guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in civil cases,
although it did guarantee the right to a jury trial in criminal cases.
22
During the ratification debate on the original Constitution, many
states objected to the absence of a jury trial guarantee in civil suits.
23
Consequently, the first Congress included such a provision in the Bill
of Rights.24 The Seventh Amendment commands that, where the
common law previously provided a right to a jury trial in civil suits,
that "right to trial by a jury shall be preserved. ' '25
The states' demand for civil jury trials was rooted in the histori-
cal perspectives of the colonists. 26 Through a bitter war, the colonists
established a nation that was less than twenty years old, but carried
vivid memories of the oppressive British monarchy and its appointed
judges. 27 The colonists believed that trial by a group of peers would
best protect their rights and freedoms. 28 Thus, in 1791, the common
law guaranteed a trial by jury for civil claims, and the colonists de-
manded that this guarantee continue. 29
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF SPECIALIZED COMMERCIAL COURTS IN
VARIOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS
To understand the modem controversy over the right to a jury
trial in complex commercial litigation, it is helpful to examine the
common law as first practiced in the royal courts of England. Such
scrutiny will illustrate the vast differences between suits at common
law, as litigated by the colonists, and modem complex commercial
litigation, such as Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. 30
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
23. ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 133 (1988). Delegates from New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts "stirred trouble"
as Madison had expected. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 294-98 (1966).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
26. THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 277, 307, 316 (Leonard
W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION];
see also Henderson, supra note 24, at 294-98.
27. MORGAN, supra note 23, at 140.
28. THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION, supra note 26, at 211.
29. Id. at 277.
30. 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Anti-
trust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
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A. The Evolution of Commercial Law: The Law Merchant
The United States and most of the commonwealth nations follow
the tradition of English common law. 31 However, there is an inherent
contradiction within these systems. In the seventeenth century, Eng-
land unified all branches of law, including commercial law, into one
common law.32 However, common law countries continue to use the
terms "mercantile law" and "commercial law." 33 Moreover, England
now has a "commercial court" whose judges are assigned based on
their commercial expertise.
34
In contrast to modem times, an autonomous body of commercial
law applied among English merchants of the Middle Ages.35 This
law, referred to as the "Law Merchant," was an amalgamation of
many European merchant laws, and was entirely distinct from the
English common law developed by royal judges.36 Tradition and his-
tory account for its refinements, as the Law Merchant was born of
practice, operated for merchants, by merchants. 37 It emphasized the
importance of good faith among merchants, and established a legal
rate of interest on commercial loans. 3 In addition, the Law
Merchant formulated special rules for sales, companies, agents, and
31. See generally Roger W. Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
32. For a discussion of England's unification of all branches of law into one common law,
see infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
33. In the United States, for example, Congress drafted the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") in 1962. JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1 (3d ed. 1988). Although the U.C.C. governs business transactions involving the sale
of goods in the United States, it has no independent legal authority, save in those states whose
legislatures have enacted it into law. Id.
34. MARY A. GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 188 (1982). This
court is known as the Restrictive Practices Court. Professional British judges share the bench
with ten laymen who are experts in industry, commerce, and public affairs. However, this
court does not share the respect the English bar accords its ordinary courts. Id.
35. LEON E. TRACKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL
LAW 23 (1983).
36. Id. at 7-12. The "Law Merchant" is also referred to as Lex Mercatoria. Id. at 8. For
a general discussion of the Law Merchant, see TRACKMAN, supra note 35; ROBERT S. LOPEZ
& IRVING W. RAYMOND, MEDIEVAL TRADE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD (1968);
Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978).
37. Denis Tallon, Civil Law and Commercial Law, in 8 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 2, at 8 (Konrad Zweigert ed., 1983).
38. TRACKMAN, supra note 35, at 10. "[T]he rule governing the performance of agree-
ments was quite straight-forward-merchants were obliged to observe their commitments.
Good faith was the essence of the mercantile agreement. Reciprocity and the threat of busi-
ness sanctions compelled performance." Id.
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the rescission of contracts. 39
Under the Law Merchant, commercial disputes were settled in
specialized courts, separate from the royal courts of England.4° Two
commercial court systems developed, each with jurisdiction over spe-
cific commercial transactions.41 One system evolved in the merchant
towns of Italy and the ports of Flanders, now part of Belgium, where
laws governing trade guilds and corporations were integrated into the
municipal codes.42 The second system was governed by trading fair
customs, and gave rise to institutions such as bills of exchange and
bankruptcy.43 The jurisdiction of these merchant courts was initially
limited to commercial transactions among merchants, but was later
extended to include transactions among non-merchants."
B. The Demise of the Law Merchant
In the seventeenth century, the Law Merchant underwent dra-
matic changes, as public authorities sought to bring it under public
supervision.45 This "nationalization" and codification of commercial
law spread from country to country, as governments increasingly in-
tervened in trade.46 With its codification, the Law Merchant was no
longer the law of merchants, based on subjective criteria, but became
the law governing all commercial transactions, based on objective
criteria.4 7
England dismantled its merchant law system by a two-stage pro-
cess, beginning with the royal court's absorption of the English
merchant court.48 At best, merchants faced many difficulties in oper-
ating under the new rules of the royal court. First, they had to estab-
lish their status as merchants. 49 Next, merchants had to prove
39. Id. at 10-12.
40. Id. at 24-25.
41. WILLIAM MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT
50-51, 80 (1963).
42. Id.
43. Id. This body of law is often referred to asjus nundinarum. Tallon, supra note 37, at
8.
44. Tallon, supra note 37, at 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 8. The second stage of England's dismantlement of the Law Merchant oc-
curred under the influence of Lord Mansfield. Id. For a more detailed discussion of this
unification, see infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
49. TRACKMAN, supra note 35, at 26-27.
1991]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
specific commercial customs in England.50 This posed additional
problems for merchant litigants, as typical English jurors were not
equipped, educationally or socially, to understand commercial cus-
toms. Further, because royal judges were unfamiliar with the special-
ized area of commercial law, they were of little help charging jurors
with instructions. 51
As English law fell into further disarray, Lord Mansfield, the
Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1786, intervened. 52 Lord Mansfield
created a cohesive body of law, which greatly simplified the task of
royal judges. 53 First, Lord Mansfield adopted rules of commercial
law applicable to everyone, not just merchants.54 Second, he estab-
lished a procedure whereby special juries, comprised of London
merchants, would apply the customary commercial rules and render
the requisite findings.5 5 These findings were then integrated into the
common law.56 Once England adopted Lord Mansfield's innovations,
the Law Merchant disappeared as an independent commercial law.57
With its disappearance, commercial law lost its international charac-
ter, its flexibility, and its adaptability.
The United States common law, adopted from English common
law, is an attempt to harmonize two systems of law.58 The English
common law's absorption of merchant law was simply an historical
accident, never logically conceived or executed. 59 With a similar lack
of logic, United States courts continue to memorialize this accident of
law. Ironically, today in England and in all civil law countries, there
50. Id.
51. Id. The merchants' concerns about their fates being decided at the hands of these
juries are as relevant today as they were in the seventeenth century. In fact, these concerns
could have been voiced in the Pennsylvania courtroom where Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. clashed resoundingly. 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated sub
nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
52. TRACKMAN, supra note 35, at 27-28.
53. Id. For a general discussion of Lord Mansfield's effect on the codification of commer-
cial law, see Mitchell, supra note 41, at 77-78, 107, 161; Jane Giddings, Lord Mansfield: A
Biography of William Murray, First Earl of Mansfield 1705-1793, Lord Chief Justice for Thirty-
Two Years, 102 L.Q. REv. 638 (1986) (book reviews); Derrick Owles, Lord Mansfield, 135
NEw L.J. 1134 (1985) (book reviews).
54. TRACKMAN, supra note 35, at 27-28.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See generally Kirst, supra note 31, at 1.
59. Id.
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are no jury trials for civil actions.60 Therefore, the United States
stands alone among these countries in its guarantee of a jury trial for
commercial litigation.
6l
C. The English Writ System
In 1791, England had three major common law courts: Exche-
quer, Common Pleas, and King's Bench.62 The Court of Chancery,
from which the Delaware Chancery Court derives its name, was Eng-
land's principal court of equity.63 As is true of many legal structures,
these courts were not created through one grand monarchical gesture,
nor even through a structured process. Rather, they evolved over
many centuries to meet emerging legal needs and, no doubt, to en-
hance the political aspirations of court officers.64 Each court grew
with the increased specialization of these officers of the King.65 How-
ever, the degree of development varied among the courts. 66 And,
since each court developed at a different pace, most court procedures
also varied. 6
7
Although there were a variety of English court procedures, all
courts employed the "writ system." 68 Originally, the writ was a royal
order to perform some duty, such as redress a wrong or appear before
60. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. PIrr. L.
REV. 935, 982 (1982).
61. Id.
62. Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on
the Zenith Case, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (1983). The Court of Exchequer was concerned
with cases affecting the royal revenue and possessed a limited civil jurisdiction. The Court of
King's Bench had jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, and
certiorari. Finally, the Court of Common Pleas heard civil cases brought by one individual
against another. RONALD J. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 7-9 (6th ed. 1985).
63. Devlin, supra note 62, at 1590-91. The Court of Chancery was later added to the
three royal courts. WALKER, supra note 62, at 14; see also infra notes 74-75 and accompany-
ing text.
64. WALKER, supra note 62, at 9; see also William Bassett, Exploring the Origins of the
Western Legal Tradition, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1573-84 (1985).
65. WALKER, supra note 62, at 14.
66. Id. at 43. For example, until the fourteenth century, common law judges, especially
those of the Court of Exchequer, could exercise some discretion in the application of the law.
However, as the writ system solidified, such discretion disappeared. Id. For a discussion of
the English writ system, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 4-5.
68. Id. at 7-8. The Court of Exchequer exercised jurisdiction through the writs of debt
and covenant. The Court of Common Pleas exercised jurisdiction over personal actions of
debt, covenant, and detinue. The Court of King's Bench used the writ of latitat et discurrit
("arrest the defendant wherever he 'lurks and runs' "). Id.
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the court. 69 Eventually, it evolved into the method by which an indi-
vidual could initiate a lawsuit, similar to the complaint commonly
used in the United States.70 However, because the writ's original pur-
pose was to command the performance of a specific action, it severely
limited the subject matter of a lawsuit.7 ' If the cause of action could
not fit into the writ language, the plaintiff was entitled to no legal
recourse, as the writ could be neither amended nor combined with
another writ.72 Together, these restrictions reduced all common law
suits to a few related issues, narrowly defined by the writ of choice. 73
To remedy this problem, the English justice system developed a chan-
cery court to address cases for which remedies at law were inade-
quate.74 With the development of this new court, a plaintiff could
bring suit in England's Court of Chancery any time a cause of action
did not fit under the language of a writ.75
D. Legal and Equitable Remedies in the United States
Like England, the United States adopted a dual court system
that provided separate forums for actions seeking legal remedies and
those seeking equitable remedies.76 This dichotomy continued until
1938, when Congress merged the federal courts under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 77 Today, enforcing the distinction between
equitable and legal remedies results in irrational applications of the
Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee. For example, in Curtis v.
Loether,78 the Supreme Court recognized Congress' power "to entrust
enforcement of statutory rights to ... [a] specialized court of equity
69. Id.
70. WALKER, supra note 62, at 28; see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZ-
ARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 10 (1985).
71. Id. at 42.
72. Id. at 43.
73. Id. at 31.
74. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQurrY 5-7 (2d ed. 1936).
75. WALKER, supra note 62, at 55.
76. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 70, at 17. When Congress created the federal court
system in 1789, it created a single system that administered law and equity separately. Id
77. Id. at 18. The Enabling Act of 1934 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp.
1991)) granted the Supreme Court the power to prescribe forms of process, writs, pleadings,
and motions, as well as the power to dictate the practices of the district courts and courts of
appeal. Id.
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on September 16, 1938. Two prin-
cipal features were the unification of law and equity courts, and the retention of jury trials in
actions formerly "at law." Id.
78. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
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free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment. ' 79 However,
although prior cases held that the federal bankruptcy court is such a
"specialized court of equity," the Supreme Court, in Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg,80 ignored the relevancy of the forum that Congress
designated to hear bankruptcy claims. 8' Instead, the Court focused
solely on the "legal" nature of the petitioner's claim, and held that a
party to a bankruptcy proceeding, a suit in equity, has a Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury.8 2 In a strong dissent, Justice
White argued that juries would be disruptive in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, would "unravel the statutory scheme established by Congress,"
and would contradict prior court rulings.8 3 Justice White pointed out
that the right to a trial by jury is determined not only by the nature of
the claim, but also by the choice of forumA4 For instance, the
Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not apply
when a "suit at common law" is heard in state court, 85 and does not
apply in federal administrative proceedings.8 6 In fact, courts often
consider the character of the federal forum in which the claim will be
heard to determine if the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury
trial applies.8
7
Frozen within the Seventh Amendment, this distinction between
equitable and legal remedies goes to the heart of the controversy over
complex commercial litigation and the right to a jury trial.8 8 The Sev-
enth Amendment was drafted in 1791, and the United States has
grown exponentially since that time.89 Today, cases often involve mil-
lions of documents, but United States courts continue to apply a jury
trial standard developed during an agrarian and unindustrialized
79. Id. at 195. In Curtis v. Loether, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amend-
ment entitled either party, on demand, to a jury trial in actions for damages under the fair
housing provision of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 191.
80. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
81. Id. at 64.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting).
84. Id. In his dissent, Justice White asked the majority, "Just where are the petitioners
going to obtain the jury trial to which the Court deems them entitled?" Id (emphasis added).
85. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
86. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987).
87. Granfinanciera, S.A., 492 U.S. at 79 (White, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(addressing complex patent infringement issues).
89. Stephen Adler, Can Juries Do Justice to Complex Suits?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1989,
§ 2, at 1.
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eraP° During that era, the average jury faced a simple and limited set
of issues, and procedural devices eliminated the possibility of complex
litigation ever reaching them.91 A trial of more than a day was ex-
traordinary. 92 This is in strong contrast to the anticipated two year
trial the Ninth Circuit required a jury to endure in In re U.S. Finan-
cial Securities Litigation,93 and the one year jury trial consumed by
Zenith Radio Corp. 
94
Beyond doubt, applying the Seventh Amendment by such rote
recital of old common law causes tension and inconsistency among
federal courts. Just as the English writ system became obsolete due to
its rigidity, so too may the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee,
if applied without regard to its fitness for the issues at hand.
E. Modern Commercial Autonomy in Foreign Legal Systems
Today, only the Romano-German legal systems recognize the
autonomy of commercial law, as signified by the existence of a com-
mercial code.95 The three principle commercial codes of Europe are
the French Commercial Code of 1807,96 the Spanish Commercial
Code of 1885,97 and the German Commercial Code of 1900.98 France
was the stabilizing influence in Europe that insured the dichotomy
between civil and commercial law would survive both codification and
the centralization of justice.99 In its Commercial Code of 1807,
France established separate commercial courts within its first level of
jurisdiction, the Tribunal de Commerce.1°° Most other civil law
90. Id.
91. Devlin, supra note 62, at 1573.
92. Id.
93. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
94. 478 F. Supp. at 889.
95. Tallon, supra note 37, at 10. According to Professor Denis Tallon of the University
of Law, Economics and Social Sciences of Paris, the autonomy of commercial law is "always
confirmed by the existence of a commercial code." Id. However, many of these codes serve
more as symbols than as the primary source of rules governing commerce. Id
96. Dalloz, Code de commerce [C. COM.], translated in GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
FRENCH LAW: CONSTITUTION AND SELECTED LEGISLATION ch. 5 (1990) [hereinafter CoM-
MERCIAL CODE OF FRANCE].
97. C6digo de Commercio [C.CoM.], translated in FERNANDO POMBO, DOING BUSINESS
IN SPAIN (1987) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL CODE OF SPAIN].
98. Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB], translated in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY
app. 2 (Bernd Ruster ed., 1991) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL CODE OF GERMANY]; Tallon,
supra note 37, at 10.
99. Tallon, supra note 37, at 10.
100. COMMERCIAL CODE OF FRANCE, supra note 96; Tallon, supra note 37, at 10.
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countries followed suit.10'
The principle differences among European commercial codes
may stem from their varying criteria for applicability. For example,
the German Commercial Code adopts a subjective criterion, as it ap-
plies only to merchants and those practicing commerce. 10 2 In other
words, it is a law that applies only to a designated professional class,
over which the German commercial courts always have jurisdic-
tion. 0 3 In contrast, the Spanish Commercial Code employs an objec-
tive criterion, focusing primarily on the commercial activities
involved."°4 The Spanish Commerical Code regulates certain transac-
tions categorized as "commercial," and consists primarily of rules
governing such transactions. 0 5 The identity or professional class of
the parties is irrelevant. 106 Rather, Spanish commercial courts have
jurisdiction to examine all cases relating to commerce, without dis-
tinction as to merchant and non-merchant participants.
0 7
The model for a mixed system is the French Commercial
Code. 08 Although early French common law leaned toward a subjec-
tive criterion, by focusing on the class of participants involved in a
transaction, the French Commercial Code was strongly influenced by
the French Revolution of 1787.'09 To implement its post-revolution-
ary principles of citizen equality and freedom of trade, France sup-
pressed the privileges of its nobility.1 O However, France retained its
commercial courts, despite pervasive hostility toward specialized
courts. "'1
It is also important to consider the Japanese justice system, as
Japanese litigants bring many issues of complex litigation to United
States courts."i2 Japan's justice system is unique, because it combines
101. Tallon, supra note 37, at 10.
102. COMMERCIAL CODE OF GERMANY, supra note 98, art. 1; Tallon, supra note 37, at
14.
103. Tallon, supra note 37, at 14.
104. COMMERCIAL CODE OF SPAIN, supra note 97, art. 2; Tallon, supra note 37, at 21.
105. COMMERCIAL CODE OF SPAIN, supra note 97, art. 2; Tallon, supra note 37, at 21.
106. Tallon, supra note 37, at 21.
107. Id.
108. COMMERCIAL CODE OF FRANCE, supra note 96.
109. Tallon, supra note 37, at 11.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Royal Coast Dev. Corp. v. Chalon Corp., No. 89-C00037, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18658 (D. Haw. June 12, 1990); Nippon Emo-Trans Co., Ltd. v. Emo-Trans, Inc., 744
F. Supp. 1215 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 734
(D.D.C. 1990).
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both French and German law, with an overlay of United States re-
forms. 11 3 Although Japan's private law was initially influenced by
French law, Japan's first commercial code, adopted in 1890, was
based on the German Commercial Code. 1 4 After World War II, the
United States government exerted pressure on Japan to amend its
commercial law, and Japan acquiesced.11 5 Since 1947, Japan has in-
troduced legislation on monopolies, competition, and the abuse of
power, all of which were influenced by United States models.11 6 Ja-
pan, like the United States, has no specific commercial court.11
7
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF TRADE
The greatest impetus for modifying complex commercial litiga-
tion procedures in the United States is the increasing internationaliza-
tion of economic relationships. In 1992, the European Economic
Community ("EC") will become an economic reality, and Europe will
stand as a single, powerful economic force.118 When this happens,
non-European corporations will no longer regard choice-of-forum
courts, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, as truly neu-
tral. 119 Thus, the proposed Pennsylvania Courts of Special Chancery
may be one of the few tribunals in the world offering neutrality, judi-
cial expertise, and the expeditious resolution of international mercan-
tile disputes. 1
20
In response to the need for a neutral international court, a unified
legal system may someday develop. This system would likely begin
by addressing elements of commercial law within a federal state, such
as Germany or the United States; a regional union, such as Benelux; a
113. Tallon, supra note 37, at 40. For a general discussion of the Japanese legal system,
see Takeshi Kojima, Civil Procedure Reform in Japan, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1218 (1990);
Michael P. Waxman, The Japanese Legal System: Myth and Reality, 81 Wis. B. BULL. 27
(1988); Donald L. Uchtmann et al., The Developing Japanese Legal System: Growth and
Change in the Modern Era, 23 GoNz. L. REv. 349 (1988).
114. Talton, supra note 37, at 40.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Kenji Sanekata, Antitrust in Japan: Recent Trends and their Socio-Polit-
ical Background, U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REv. 379 (1986); Akinori Uesugi, Japanese Antimono-
poly Policy: Its Past and Future, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 709 (1982).
117. Tallon, supra note 37, at 40.
118. See Gordon Slynn, Aspects of the European Economic Community, 18 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1985); Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EuR. L. REV. 147 (1982).
119. Tallon, supra note 37, at 36.
120. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's proposed Courts of Special Chancery, see infra
notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
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supranational institution, such as the EC; or on a worldwide scale.' 2'
In their attempt to unify, the entities involved will certainly detach
the law of international economic relations from any national con-
trol. 1 22 The EC demonstrated this truism in a 1964 landmark case,
Costa v. ENEL,12 3 which announced that EC law takes precedence
over national law, including national constitutional law. 124 The basic
law of the EC is the 1957 Treaty of Rome, with the European Court
of Justice responsible for the Treaty's implementation. 125 As evidence
of the far-reaching impact of a unified legal system, the EC's
supremacy doctrine, announced by a court without a country and
with few independent enforcement powers, was accepted by all six of
the original EC member nations.1
26
VI. THE PENNSYLVANIA PROPOSED COURTS
OF SPECIAL CHANCERY
On September 10, 1990, a bill was introduced in the Penn-
sylvania State Senate, proposing the establishment of specialized
courts to deal only with corporate and commercial issues. 27 These
Pennsylvania Courts of Special Chancery would be patterned some-
what after the Delaware Court of Chancery. 28  The Delaware
court-the only one of its kind in the United States-hears disputes
concerning solely corporate association matters, such as hostile take-
overs and shareholder suits. 29 The remedies available in the Dela-
121. Tallon, supra note 37, at 10.
122. Id.
123. 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964) (Italy), reprinted in MAURO CAPELLETTI & WILLIAM CO-
HEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117 (1979).
124. Id. at 593.
125. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 173 (1973).
126. CAPELLETII & COHEN, supra note 123, at 116.
127. Chancery Courts Act, S. Bill 1170, 1990 Sess., 1990 Pa. Gen. Ass. This bill was
reintroduced to the Pennsylvania State Senate on March 1, 1991, at S. Bill 777, 1991 Sess.,
1991 Pa. Gen. Ass. 822. See also Milo Geyelin, Pennsylvania Lawmakers to Consider Special-
ized Court for Business Matters, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1990, at A3.
As it now stands, the judicial power in Pennsylvania is vested in a unified judicial system.
Those with jurisdiction over civil litigation are the Courts of Common Pleas, the Common-
wealth Court, the Superior Court, and the Supreme Court. The Courts of Common Pleas have
local, not statewide, jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Court deals with issues unique to the
commonwealth, and the Superior and Supreme Courts function as the appellate courts. 42 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 301-934 (1988).
128. Geyelin, supra note 127, at A3.
129. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (amended 1951). One highly publicized case which
originated in the Delaware Court of Chancery is Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ware Court of Chancery are purely equitable; namely, court orders
and injunctions.
130
In contrast to the Delaware Court of Chancery, the Pennsylvania
bill proposes a court with exclusive jurisdiction not only over corpo-
rate equity matters, but also over suits claiming damages in commer-
cial disputes where the contested amount exceeds $500,000.131 The
litigants would not be entitled to a jury trial; rather, they would ap-
pear before an appointed judge who specializes in business law.132
This controversial provision would require the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture to amend Pennsylvania's Constitution with regard to its guaran-
tee of a trial by jury. 1
33
Delaware's experience with its chancery court epitomizes the
benefits of specialized commercial courts. In fact, the Delaware
Court of Chancery is cited as the primary reason why nearly half of
all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") are
incorporated in Delaware.1
34
Interestingly, Pennsylvania-presently home to only four per-
cent of the NYSE members-is the vanguard of business advance-
ments. 135 For example, in 1953, Pennsylvania became the first state in
the country to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code, 136 and in 1990,
Pennsylvania passed the toughest anti-takeover law in the nation. 137
Delaware's successful Court of Chancery highlights the importance of
946 (1985) (Unocal made a self-tender for its own shares which excluded from participation T.
Boone Pickens, the stockholder who made a hostile tender offer).
130. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (amended 1951); Geyelin, supra note 127, at A3.
131. Chancery Courts Act, supra note 127; PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Dis-
CUSSION PAPER CONCERNING PROPOSED COURTS OF SPECIAL CHANCERY (Aug. 30, 1991)
[hereinafter DISCUSSION PAPER].
132. DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 131, at 5.
133. Chancery Courts Act, supra note 127, div. III, § 301. As it currently reads, the Penn-
sylvania Constitution requires: "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate." PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
134. Geyelin, supra note 127, at A3.
135. Id.
136. 12A PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1953). The Pennsylvania legislature
repealed this Uniform Commercial Code in 1980. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 (1980).
137. 1990 Pa. Laws 36; 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 (Purdon). This law amends Title 15
(Corporations and Unincorporated Associations) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.
It clarifies the fiduciary obligations of directors of corporations and other associations; clarifies
certain definitions; adds provisions relating to control-share acquisitions; and provides for dis-
gorgement by certain controlling shareholders, following attempts to acquire control of certain
corporations, of severance compensation for employees terminated following such control-
share acquisitions. Vineeta Anand, Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Law Slams Stock Prices, Study
Finds, INVESTOR DAILY, Oct. 1, 1990, at 31; see also Geyelin, supra note 127, at A3.
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Pennsylvania's establishment of a business court to attract corporate
enterprises. 
38
The Philadelphia Bar Association and the Pennsylvania Business
Roundtable, an association of business executives from forty-two of
the state's largest corporations, both support the Pennsylvania bill
proposing Courts of Special Chancery. 139 They claim the bill's pri-
mary benefit is the expeditious judicial review of corporate legal mat-
ters:140 the average civil suit, with its right to a jury trial, currently
takes five years to work its way through the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas.'
41
Furthermore, the Seventh Amendment would not operate to de-
feat the proposed Pennsylvania legislation. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to
state court proceedings. 42 On the other hand, the language in Penn-
sylvania's constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil
cases. However, if the rationale for using a jury is to ensure fairness,
Pennsylvania's proposed commercial court provides an adequate sub-
stitute. The question raised by demands for jury trials in complex
commercial litigation cases is generally whether the jury will under-
stand the issues involved.143 By instituting a specialized court to hear
complex commercial cases, the complexity of such cases becomes a
non-issue and the parties are assured that they will receive fair trials
conducted by competent judges who are able to comprehend the is-
sues presented.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the evolution of the Seventh Amend-
ment's jury trial guarantee through the United States legal system. In
138. Geyelin, supra note 127, at A3.
139. Id.
140. Michael W. Armstrong, A Court For Business in the State?, PHILA. Bus. J., Sept. 17,
1990, § 1, at 1.
141. Geyelin, supra note 127, at A3.
142. Minneapolis and St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). The possibility
of excluding juries from resolving complex issues has resulted in numerous articles concerning
the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to such cases. See generally Morris S. Arnold, A
Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 829 (1980); Morris S. Arnold, A Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 986 (1980); James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury
Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial
of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 80 (1980).
143. In Re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1090 (3d Cir. 1980).
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doing so, this Article has noted the inconsistencies and incongruities
of legal decisions rendered under a rigid application of the Seventh
Amendment. Pennsylvania's proposed unjuried Court of Special
Chancery, with its pragmatic solution to the limitations of modem
courts, enables this Article to present a comparative analysis of the
right to a jury trial in complex commercial litigation.
The law has come full circle. Pennsylvania's proposed commer-
cial court is a renaissance of the Law Merchant, as is the establish-
ment of an international system of commercial law. The foundation
of the commercial court is based on the freedom of contract-the fun-
damental principle of international order. It relies on international
rules of mercantile conduct, independent of national legal systems. 144
A coherent system of addressing international commercial dis-
putes must be developed as countries continue to seek world trading
outlets. No country should have the power to insist that its own laws
settle these disputes. The legal systems of the world are simply too
diverse. In particular, the United States stands alone among most
countries in its guarantee of jury trials in civil actions.145 Any insis-
tence by the United States that this standard for commercial disputes
be employed among multinational corporations is purely
anachronistic.
144. Tallon, supra note 37, at 2-18.
145. Aldisert, supra note 60, at 982.
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